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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the military and political instability is often measured
qualitatively, with emphasis on country specific cases. This paper differs from other papers on
two fronts. First, the measurement of political instability as a combination of state failure and
political violence allows for a more in-depth analysis than would be available if instability was
examined as the onset of only one event. Second, by using panel data and maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) techniques, this paper is able to make general conclusions about the effect of
the military on instability. The findings of this paper show that the various military
characteristics are significant in affecting the probability of instability, with the most important
characteristic being previous military rule.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The onset of the Arab spring revolutions has once again shifted the spotlight on the
instability of non-democratic regimes in the Middle East region, and now raises questions on the
stability of other countries in the region. Furthermore, the recent overthrow of the Gaddafi
regime, the civil war in Syria and the Egyptian military overthrow of the democratically elected
government adds to the political uncertainty surrounding the region. Military intervention in
domestic politics, while nonexistent for strong democracies, is still a reality for developing
countries and struggling democracies. The question then becomes what is the military’s role, if
any, with political instability. Understanding what political instability is and the role of the
military in society is crucial in trying to understand the questions listed above.
Political stability is to some extent an elusive concept to define, simply because it
represents a host of events that lead up to the same conclusion. Several authors have taken
different approaches to the concept. One such author argues that political behavior is “any act by
any member of society that affects the distribution of the power to make decisions for that
society” (Ake, 1975, p.271). This means, any behaviour that maintains the power distribution
structure of society is one that makes society politically stable i.e., obeying the laws of the land.
Likewise the inverse of this definition of political stability can be applied towards the definition
of political instability.
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That being said, one cannot discuss political instability without examining the role of the
military as either a facilitator or suppressor of instability and as one author puts it “Military
intervention is a product of two sets of forces-the capacity and propensity of the military to
intervene and the conditions in the society in which it operates” (Finer (1988) cited in Henderson
and Bellamy (2002)). The vast number of political actions creates a challenge in trying to
measure the effects of the military on instability. Therefore the focus of this analysis will only be
on state failures, attempted coups and successful coups; civil violence and civil war; ethnic
violence and ethnic wars. This analysis will be divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the
introduction; the second chapter gives the reader a background on the literature surrounding
definitions of instability and civil-military relationships while addressing the ways in which these
concepts have been measured. The third chapter will review the data used in this analysis, the
variables selected and the econometric methods applied. The fourth chapter discusses the results
of the modeling technique used, and the fifth chapter summarizes the paper and addresses the
future of this study
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
As was stated in the previous section one of the biggest challenges involves accurately
defining instability. To address the complex nature of instability, the work of political scientist
Claude Ake’s (1975) provides a framework for understanding what this concept is. In it political
instability is defined as any act that deviates from the regular flow of political exchanges which
in turn represents the flow of transactions and communications among political actors. He also
cautions against solely looking at political instability within the scope of specific political
structures or political exchanges, because as he states “a form of behaviour that is destabilizing
in relation to one political structure may well be stabilizing in relation to another” (Ake, 1975, p.
274). For example, most people don’t necessarily consider elections as being a form of political
instability, but if we look at an election in the context of an autocratic regime, then according to
Ake’s definition, it becomes clear that elections are politically destabilizing.
The works of Aisen & Veiga (2012), Jong-A-Pin (2008), Gurgul & Lach (2013), and
Miljikovic & Rimal (2008) shed light on various ways to empirically measure political instability.
For instance, in the analysis of growth and stability Aisen & Veiga (2012) look at instability
from the perspective of a regime change via the number of cabinet changes experienced in a
country for a given year. When they find that this measure is insufficient they create six alternate
indices to account for instability by looking at three main categories: regime instability caused by
external factors such as coups, within regime instability caused by internal factors such as
legislative elections, and a violence index.
3

This is similar to the stance taken by Jong-A-Pin (2008) except that his analysis examines
a much wider array of events, and he uses explanatory factor analysis to find commonalities
amongst his events to build his definition of instability. In doing so he is able to measure
instability across four dimensions: politically motivated violence, mass civil protest, instability
within the regime and instability of the regime. Both authors find their results are most
significant when instability is defined as: regime instability (caused by external factors such as
coups) and within regime instability (caused by internal factors such as legislative elections).
This suggests that events that cause a direct change in leadership are much better indicators of
instability than those that do not in the context of their research.
Gurgul & Lach (2013) take a somewhat different approach in their analysis of instability
and growth across central and eastern European countries and define instability as the number of
government changes and the number of major government changes experienced, with major
government changes representing a new political party in cabinet. While the differences between
these two categories are vague their analysis showed that only major government changes were
significant, corroborating the earlier findings of Aisen & Veiga (2012) and Jong-A-Pin (2008) of
within regime instability as yielding statistically fruitful results.
That being said Miljkovic & Rimal (2008) put an interesting spin on the definition of
political instability. They acknowledge that instability is more of a measure of uncertainty in a
regime as opposed to a measure of regime failure, but they also contend that uncertainty is
almost impossible to quantify, and therefore they define instability across three dimensions:
irregular government changes (through unlawful and unconstitutional ways), regular government
changes (election of a new political party), and if it is stable or unstable (defined as being a
liberal democracy or dictatorship for at least 25 years).
4

By examining Ake’s (1975) definition and Miljkovic & Rimal (2008)’s earlier assertion
of uncertainty, an argument can be made that time isn’t always the best indicator of stability. For
example a regime might be a liberal democracy for 25 years and within that time period undergo
multiple elections. However the mere act of having elections creates some amount of uncertainty
because no one is ever 100% certain on the outcome of an election or the participants in the
election. In that case simply looking at the length of time the regime remained ‘unchanged’ can
be somewhat misleading.
From the previous literature one finds that the constant theme through their definition is
regime change, whether it is caused by friction within the government or outside the government.
In most countries regardless of how deeply involved its military is in political affairs the military
is still an external actor, and as an external actor they are unable to cause the type of internal
regime change put forth by Aisen & Veiga (2012), Jong-A-Pin (2008), Gurgul & Lach (2013),
and Miljikovic & Rimal (2008). This often means that any changes in the government that they
require is done via coups. To examine this relationship Collier & Hoeffler (2007) test the effects
of monetary incentives on the risk of a coup. Their analysis reveals that for high coup risk
regions like Africa, the government responded by increasing military spending, while in low
coup risk regions the government’s response was to cut military spending and reduce the size of
the army. Their results also show that the behavior by African governments decreased the risk,
while for the other regions there was no evidence supporting its effectiveness. This means that
governments in this region sometimes try to buyout their own military to maintain their longevity.
The relationship suggested by Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) findings differs from those done in an
earlier study by Terrell (1971).
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Instead of looking at military expenditure and the risk of a coup Terrell (1971), looks at
political instability and the level of military effort. His work suggests that the relationship runs in
the opposite direction with instability causing the military’s involvement. He finds that there is
no relationship between instability and military expenditures but there is a negative relationship
between military size and instability. He further comments that governments are reluctant or
unable to increase the size of their military during times of instability.
Other authors such as Tusalem (2013) and Adams (2010) have also tried to examine the
relationship between the military and instability by looking at it from another different angle.
Tusalem (2013) proceeds to examine the effects of military participation in politics on
democratic stability and accountability and finds that states with politically active militaries are
more likely to face lower levels of political accountability and thus less likely to aid in
democratic stability, suggesting that in a consensus building atmosphere non democratic
institutions are very detrimental. He also finds that military intervention as represented by coups
decreases democratic accountability, and militaries with control over social policy, security,
defence and officials in government post are more likely to weaken the strength of democratic
institutions. Adams (2010) on the other hand examines the use of conscription as a way to
stabilize democratic regimes. His results indicate that not only is there no relationship between
conscription and democratic stability but there is a negative relationship between democratic
consolidation and conscription, suggesting that as democracies age their use of conscription
fades. This further suggests that the military does not aid in promoting stability, at least when it
comes to democracies.
From the above literature one can see that the relationship between the military and
regime stability do not always go hand in hand. Furthermore in situations where they do, the
6

relationship can be problematic for the regime seeing as it encourages a high level of political
participation of the military, which in turn makes it likely to be the source of instability. Despite
the arguments made by the other authors, this view is not held by everyone. Bah (2013) argues
that military intervention in Guinean politics from 1984 to 2010 was beneficial in maintaining
stability during that time period while her neighbours were undergoing periods of instability. He
further argues that their adoption of an ethnic like mentality (us vs. them), towards other
segments of the state allowed them to maintain cohesiveness and strength, preventing a
downward spiral towards intra military killings and cycles of military inspired coups, thus
allowing them to focus on furthering their status and economic self interest.
Naturally the question arises, what causes the military to want to intervene? The works of
Decalo (1989), Henderson & Bellamy (2002), Martini and Taylor (2011), Shah (2011) and
Heiduk (2011) provides some clues as to why this is the case. For example, Henderson &
Bellamy’s (2002) analysis of military intervention in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Papua
New Guinea provides insights into the conditions required for intervention to occur. They argue
that when militaries see themselves as being above the civilian regime they are more likely to
intervene. This view is corroborated by Shah (2011) in his essay. He comments that in a
developing country like Pakistan the lack of democratic constraints and feelings of superiority in
the Pakistani military has made intervention a regular occurrence.
Henderson & Bellamy (2002) further argue that another condition for intervention is the
level of dependency between the regime and the military. Indeed when regimes are dependent on
the military for survival, regimes pay of their “debt” by giving lucrative privileges to the military.
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Martini and Taylor’s (2011) essay shows that in Egypt the level dependence between the
military and the regime was quite strong. They state that since the early 50’s all rulers in the
country have either come from the military or relied on it for support and in return the military
elite enjoyed access to perks and privileges unavailable to the general populace (Martini &
Taylor, 2011). This has the effect of insulating the regime from potential opponents and allowing
it to remain relatively stable, a tactic regimes sometimes employ to maintain and strengthen its
control over the military, by turning a powerful enemy into a powerful ally. This also turns out to
be the case in Heiduk’s (2011) analysis of civil-military relations in three South East Asian
countries. He also comments that as a consequence of increased political participation the
primary role of the military is now the protection of regimes from internal opponents rather than
external ones. This relationship isn’t always beneficial and as time showed the dependency
between the military and a regime can be problematic, as was the case for Egypt. As Henderson
& Bellamy (2002) put it “the greater the dependency, the greater the ease of further military
intervention”. (Henderson & Bellamy, 2002, p.130).
The complex nature of civil-military relations begs the question of how should civilian
regimes proceed in maintaining control over their militaries? One view put forth is that by
Huntington (1957) which states that civilian control can be strengthened by maximizing the level
of professionalism within the military through the creation of an independent, and autonomous
military sphere within government (Huntington (1957) cited in Heiduk 2011). Heiduk stresses
one of the criticisms levied against this view, which states that this approach can actually make
the military less prone to subjection under civilian rule by amplifying the differences between the
two (Heiduk 2011).
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Decalo (1989) on the other hand argues that militaries with a more professional focus and
militaries with ‘populist’ undertones are still prone to disrupt the current regime whenever they
please. This suggests that the choice to intervene is not influenced by the level of professionalism
or by a more communal mind set but rather by the factors given by Henderson & Bellamy (2002)
That being said, other countries have also pursued various methods of maintaining their civilmilitary relations. Decalo’s (1989) study on the stability of some African countries shows that
they have been able to curtail the ambitions of their military through the following methods: The
first involves preferential recruitment into the army, where having a military with members who
share similar characteristics with the ruling regime limits their chance of intervention. The
second method is the creation of a well paid, well equipped force-usually a paramilitary security
force or presidential guard- to keep the military in check. The third method is to appoint family
members into key positions in the military. The forth is the use of foreigners in the officer corps,
because officers are assumed to be neutral. The fifth is the guarantee of external military support
in case of domestic intervention. The sixth is by the regime maintaining its legitimacy through
popular support, and the seventh is by providing monetary incentives in exchange for loyalty.
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CHAPTER III
DATA ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY
This analysis attempts to look at the relationship between political instability and various
military characteristics. The dependent variables are: the occurrence of state failure, the
occurrence of civil or ethnic violence, and the occurrence of civil or ethnic war, attempted coups
and successful coups, all of which were obtained from the Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP)
dataset. 1 For this analysis 17 years worth of data from 1991 to 2007 was examined for 115
countries which gives 1944 observations.
For independent variables the aim was to try to account for conditions conducive to
political instability. In doing so the independent variables are split into several categories. The
first category examines the military by measuring its behaviour and some characteristics. The
first variable of interest is conscription.2 This is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 for
each year in which the country had and enforced conscription and 0 during the years in which it
is abolished, not practiced or never occurred. This data was obtained from War Resisters
International’s website. This variable was included because conscription reveals a lot about the
nature of the military in society. It can be said that in countries with conscription the military
may often take on the additional role of ‘educating’ the general populace on how to become
model citizens.

1

The data is available from the CSP website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
Data for conscription was obtained via War Resisters International’s website: http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/index.html,
Nation Masters: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/,
2
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Next is military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the growth rate of military
expenditure. More often than not defence budgets not only provide insights into the relationship
between the military and the current regime, but also its technological capabilities. The data for
military expenditure was obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) military expenditure dataset.3 Included is the growth rate in military expenditure. This is
because the growth rate over time may yield insights as to whether the regime is anticipating or
responding to an internal threat. Next is a measure of manpower by looking at military personnel
as a percentage of the general population.4
The next variable included is past military regimes. This is measured by creating a binary
variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country’s own military has either ruled or intervened in the
country’s political process since its independence or date of last subjugation and 0 if otherwise.5
Since some countries have been independent since the 19th century only military regimes that
occurred in the 20th century are counted. Also if a country had experienced military rule in one
year, all subsequent time periods receive a value of one. This is based on the assumption as a
representation of the country’s history its effects linger long after the event has finished. In some
countries with military rule, the perpetrators may form some sort of ruling council or committee
with their fellow conspirators, while in others a single individual emerges and claims the title of
head of state. For the purpose of this analysis these two events are assumed to yield the same
outcome of military rule.

3

SIPRI Military Expenditure data set can be obtained via: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
Military Personnel data was obtained from the correlates of war, nations capabilities dataset:
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
5
This variable was created with data from the CIA world fact Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/ and Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/
4
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Other events such as the country imposing martial law are not coded as military rule if
the imposition is done by a civilian government and the civilian government retains control
throughout the duration of the imposition. For countries with multiple instances of military rule
only the latest instance from date of independence is used.
Diversity in the military is proxied via the fractionalization scores from Alesina et al.
(2003). In it they calculate fractionalization across three dimensions: ethnicity, language, and
religion. Since military diversity is often not observable or reported for data collection two
assumptions are made. The first is the non exclusion in recruitment policies based on ethnicity,
language & religion. The second assumption is that the military as an institution is a smaller
version of society with the same composition but different rules. There is an important caveat to
be made. Since Alesina et al. (2003) only measure diversity at a point in time there is a natural
danger in assuming that these measures do not change over time. The authors address these
issues and find that there are no drastic changes in their fractionalization scores within a 20-30
year time period. Since the time span of this analysis falls within the 20-30 year range from the
date the measures were calculated confidence in this variable as a proxy for diversity is
maintained.
The second category is with variables that look at economic growth. The first is the
annual GDP per capita. This measures the relative well being of general populace. The next
variable included is exports as a share of GDP to account for the effects of trade, followed by the
GDP deflator as a measure of inflation. The use of the GDP deflator instead of the traditional
CPI has more to do with convenience than theory; lack of consistency in CPI for the countries
used in this analysis gave rise to the use of the GDP deflator as a better measure.
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Lacking a suitable source for an unemployment rate the percentage of population
employed is used as a replacement for unemployment. It should be noted that there will be some
issues with accuracy associated with using this variable as a stand in for unemployment because
it makes no distinction between those who are unemployed and those who are not in the labour
force.6
The third category deals with the political system of the country. For this the polity IV
scores based of the polity IV project were used. They measure the regime type on a scale of -10
to +10, with +10 representing full democracy and -10 representing full autocracy. A variable
looking at regime length is also included. This is done by looking at the number of years since
the most recent regime change (Polity IV Project, 2013). It does this by looking at a three point
change in a country’s polity score over a span of three years or less.7
The fourth category deals with health and population. This is accounted for by looking at
the mortality rate for children under 5 for each country and the population growth rate to see if a
higher population growth is more conducive to political instability by its interaction on the
availability of resources. These variables were obtained from the World Bank website via the
World Bank Development Indicators.
The fifth category deals with regions and country age. The regions are split into seven
groups (North America, South America, Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and Island Countries)
and take on a value of 1 for if the country is in that region. There are several problems that arise
when trying to gauge how old countries are.

6

The variable for GDP per capita, % of population employed, and exports were obtained via the World Bank Development
Indicators.
7
Data for polity scores were obtained via the Polity IV Dataset from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
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Since countries are manmade they change rapidly as time progresses. In some cases
groups of people living in an area are lumped together and called a country, in other cases the
country in question might be the successor of a much larger ancient empire, or might have gone
through many wars that changed and re-changed its boundaries. To avoid this problem this
variable tries to capture how old the modern incarnation is. This is accomplished by taking either
the country’s year of independence or its year of last subjugation as the beginning date.8
This category also includes the addition of a landlocked binary variable, a Muslim
majority binary variable and an oil exporter binary variable. These 3 variables are meant to 1)
capture any of the unique characteristics of landlocked countries not accounted for by the region
indicators and 2) account for further country specific differences imbedded in the region
indicators and 3) to control for the volatility of countries that depend on petroleum as their main
source of income.91011
A table summarizing relevant statistics of the variables used in this study is presented
below.

Dependent
Variables

Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Magnitude of Civil
1944
0.0462963
0.2832
Violence
Magnitude of Civil
1944
0.2170782
0.914343
War
Magnitude of Ethnic
1944
0.1064815
0.464354
Violence
Magnitude of Ethnic
1944
0.3955761
1.296657
War
Magnitude of State
1944
0.0951646
0.537524
Failure
Attempted Coups
1944
0.0390947
0.19387
Successful Coups
1944
0.0102881
0.100933

8

Min
0

Max
3

0

6

0

5

0

10

0

4

0
0

1
1

Measurement of the country’s age was obtained via, CIA world fact book, Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica
Data for landlocked countries was created via the CIA world fact book
10
Data for Muslim majority was obtained from http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/
11
Oil Export data was made from observations from the U.S. Energy Information Administration
9
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Independent Conscription
Variables
Military Expenditure
% of Pop. In Military
Previous Military Rule
Ethnic Diversity
Religious Diversity
Mortality Rate
GDP per capita
Exports as share of
GDP
Polity Score
Population Growth
% of Pop. Employed
GDP Deflator

Table 1-cont’d
1923
0.4888196

0.500005

0

1

1802
1920
1944
1938
1944
1944
1923
1903

2.368979
1.680182
0.4840535
0.4674306
0.4308182
6.901024
7319.059
33.78643

2.031839
3.848013
0.499874
0.263677
0.238371
6.55227
12441.37
21.4508

0
0
0
0.011928
0.0034627
0.3
64.81015
0.1829688

17.5
38.27
1
0.930175
0.86026
32.02
106919.5
175.8974

1930
1943
1927
1930

3.365285
1.678693
59.28677
68.12377

6.37572
1.475439
11.66236
765.5635

-10
-7.6
30.8
-27.05

10
17.31
88.3
26762.02

Methodology
The argument can be made that trying to examine political instability as the onset of one
event is too narrow. To account for the multidimensional nature of political instability it will be
split into 4 cases. The first case which is the narrowest looks at the onset of state failure. This
variable is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 in years in which a state failure occurred
and 0 otherwise. The second case which is much broader looks at the onset of a state failure and
the onset of civil violence or ethnic violence. The third case looks at the onset of a state failure
and the onset of civil war or ethnic war. The fourth case looks at the onset of a state failure and
an attempted coups and successful coups
The multifaceted nature of political instability requires measurement techniques that
differ from standard OLS for the cases presented. Since the dependent variable in each case only
has two outcomes maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) via the logit regression is used. The
standard logistic distribution function has the form:
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P(Y=1|Xi) =

(1)

Where xβ represents the sum of the regression variables and their coefficients. This form can be
generalized into a linear format for ease of understanding:
(2)
The dependent variable
t. The variable

is a binary is the probability of the event for country i at time

represents military characteristic given by presence of conscription, military

expenditures, percent of the population in the military, previous military rule, the growth in
military expenditure, ethnic and religious diversity of the military for country I at time t. The
variable
time and

represents a host of control variables,

represents dummy variables controlling for

is the error term. The original variable that looks at state failure, ethnic violence,

civil violence, civil war and ethnic war actually measures the magnitude of each event in that
given year. Some may then ask why the use maximum likelihood estimation was preferred
instead of OLS. There were several reasons for this. The first as was stated above was to try and
account for the multidimensional nature of political instability and this is accomplished by
looking at the probability of several events occurring. Secondly, the distribution of outcomes in
the violence and war measures were neither normal nor continuous within the given range of
values. Finally an analysis of the variables showed they only measured magnitude. Meaning that
the number of values each event can take is very limited; between 0-4 for state failure and 0-10
for the war and violence measures.
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To circumvent this issue these variables were converted into a binary format. Since the
method of analysis is via MLE the interpretation of coefficient estimates can be tricky, therefore
to find the effects each variable has on the probability of instability the marginal effect of each
variable will need to be examined.
Seeing this analysis involves panel data there are several issues that need to be addressed
so as to maintain the validity of the estimates. The first of which is to account for fixed effects.
Fixed effects is appropriate if the assumption that there are unobserved characteristics within
each country that may or may not explain the occurrence of state failure is made. From this
definition fixed effects becomes the method of choice.
To perform the fixed effect method the least squared dummy variable approach (LSDV)
is employed. This involves creating dummy variables to control for each year in the observation.
Due to the rare occurrence these events amongst the countries used in this sample, trying to
perform fixed effects with country dummies proves to be ineffective. This isn’t all that surprising
considering the fact that most of the countries have zero’s for the events in question thus making
any variations between the countries that do have positive values for the events relatively small.
Another issue to address is one of heteroskedasticity. This is problematic because if the
underlying assumption of a constant variation in the error term does not hold then this could lead
to inconsistent and biased estimates. To correct for this heteroskedastic robust standard errors
throughout the remainder of this analysis
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

The results of the regression analysis for case A and B are presented in Table 2. To avoid
multicollinearity the growth of military expenditure was dropped from the regression analysis.
The first section looks at the results for case A and it shows a positive and statistically significant
relationship with conscription, expenditure, previous military rule, ethnic diversity and religious
diversity. The estimated marginal effects predict that every year a country has conscription the
probability of a state failure is expected to increase by 60.9%. This result is somewhat surprising,
however conscription during non war time situation is associated with a less efficient army and
losses to the economy (Adam, 2010), which in turn could be a signal for an already brewing
instability. Increasing the share of military expenditure by 1 standard deviation also increases
the probability of state failure by almost 15%. If the share of military expenditure increases at the
cost of other essential domestic services, like funding for the police force or funding for essential
economic programs, then the lack of these programs could create the conditions necessary for
state failure to occur. The results also show that probability of state failure increased by almost
74% if the country had a military regime in the past. This result military intervention in the
political arena is destabilizing and makes future regimes vulnerable to instability. Militaries that
are more diverse along ethnic and religious lines are also predicted to increase the probability of
state failure, with a change of one standard deviation expected to increase the probability of state
failure by 1.2 and 1.24% respectively.
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If one accepts that state failures only occur when “there [are] shut-downs of routine
government services, failure of security forces and administrators to carry out any government
directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with rival militias, warlords, or
local or regional authorities attempting to establish autonomous zones of government” (Marshall
et. al, 2013) then it’s easy to see that these events are likely to occur when large scale conflicts
like ethnic wars and sectarian violence take place. Furthermore there is no guarantee that the
military is immune or remains neutral during for they may also be participants or instigators in
such an event.
Table 2: Logit regression for Case A & B
Case A
Variables
Conscription
Military
Expenditure % of
GDP
% of Population in
Military
Previous Military
Regime
Ethnic Diversity
Religious Diversity

Coefficient

Case B

0.6202769**
0.1510108***

Std.
Error
0
0.047864

Marginal
Effect
60.93
14.88

0.047023

0.087819

0.754177**
2.026884**
2.332165**

Coefficient
1.056136***
0.272605***

Std.
Error
0
0.047864

Marginal
Effect
98.49
26.28

4.63

-0.3450373***

0.087819

-33.27

0

73.90

0.27572

0

26.31

0.00599
0.005406

1.20
1.24

1.653001***
-0.18977

0.00599
0.005406

0.95
-0.09

*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

The next section of Table 2 re-examines the previous military characteristics under the
probability of a state failure and civil violence or ethnic violence. Once again conscription is
shown to with the probability of the event, increasing the likelihood by 98.5%. This could be the
case if there was mass disapproval of the countries conscription policy, which in turn could lead
protests and rioting across the country. This specification also predicts that military expenditure
is significant and a 1 standard deviation change leads to a 26.2% increase in the probability of
the event occurring.
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The result also shows increasing the percentage of the population in the military by one
percent will decrease the probability of state failure, civil violence and ethnic violence by 33%.
This result is somewhat similar to the findings of Terrell (1971) where he finds a negative
relationship between military personnel as a percent of the population and political instability,
and comments that, the negative relationship between manpower allocations and political
instability results from the inability or reluctance of regimes to increase size during times of civil
disorder. The negative relationship between the two variables could also be because a larger
military size acts as an indicator of resources the regime possesses, deterring would be instigators of
internal violence.

Table 3: Logit regression for Case C & D
Case C
Variables
Conscription
Military
Expenditure % of
GDP
% of Population in
Military
Previous Military
Regime
Ethnic Diversity
Religious Diversity

Coefficient

Std.
Error
0

0.9205156***
0.1388097*** 0.047864

Case D
Marginal
Effects
-84.75

Coefficients
-0.2898

Std.
Error
0

Marginal
Effects
-28.35

13.68

0.021999

0.047864

2.17

-0.06016

0.087819

-5.92

0.0660924*

0.087819

6.51

0.443387**

0

38.15

1.511712**

0

143.39

0.442669

0.00599

0.26

1.01937

0.00599

0.60

-1.91581***

0.005406

-1.02

-0.34716

0.005406

-0.18

*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

Table 3 shows the results for case C and D. The results from the first section, which
examines the probability of state failure and civil and ethnic wars, are similar to those from case
A with the exception of the direction of conscription and religion. Countries with conscription
see a reduction of 84.75% in the probability of state failure and internal war, while increasing the
share of military expenditure increases the probability of instability by almost 14%.
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There are two reasons for this with the first being size. Size acts as a deterrent to
domestic threat because the vast reserves of combatants shows the availability of resources that
could lead to an unfavourable and prolonged conflict. Second is anticipation. The relationship
between military expenditure and instability could be due to the government ramping up
expenditures to in anticipation of potential conflict.
Previous military rule is shown to be significant in determining instability, once again
due to its potentially destabilizing nature as it paves the way for more competitors to use any
means necessary to challenge its legitimacy. Here religion is significant in decreasing the
probability of instability, specifically increasing the level of religious diversity in the military by
one standard deviation leads to a 1% decrease in the probability of instability. The insignificance
of ethnicity and significant and negative relationship of religion are similar to the findings of
Fearon & Laitin (2003) where they found that ethnicity and religious diversity did not make a
country more prone to civil war.

The next section of Table 3 lists the result for case D. In this specification the only
variables that are significant in predicting the onset of state failure and coups are military size
and previous military rule. This result corresponds with the analysis of Henderson & Bellamy
(2002) where they argue that if the military has been in power before then it is more likely to
intervene again via coups. This appears to be the case as the probability of instability increases
by 143% if the country had undergone previous military rule. Increasing the size of the military
also increases the probability of instability by 6%. This is also because larger militaries mean a
much larger pool of disenfranchised or charismatic individuals wanting to overthrow the regime.
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Robustness checks
The variables country age and regime length were dropped to avoid issues with the time
dummy variables. Table 4 lists the results of the robustness checks performed for Case A and
Case B. The results show that when health, economic, political, regional, and various other
country characteristics are included the only military characteristic that is significant is previous
military rule which increases the probability of state failure by 98% suggesting that the military
is a very big indicator on the likelihood of state failure. The result also shows several other
variables of noticeable significance. The first is that a one percent increase in the mortality
increases the probability of state failure by 31%. This is expected because a high mortality rate is
associated with worse health, which in turn speaks about the effectiveness of the government on
meeting basic needs of its citizens. The second is that growth in income decreases the probability
of state failure, while a one percent growth in inflation leads to a .2% increase in the probability.
This suggests that state failure is a phenomenon affecting underdeveloped countries. The third is
that countries with a large Muslim population are less likely to have state failure (-262%),
suggesting that state failure does not occur along religious backgrounds. The fourth is that oil
exporting countries are more likely to have state failure. Countries where oil exports makes up a
large percentage of their income are in danger because this income is very volatile, with a
decrease in world price having drastic domestic consequences. The sensitivity analysis from the
first case has shown that when the model is expanded to control for various other characteristics,
the only significant aspect of the military that explains the probability of state failure is previous
military rule.
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for Case A and Case B
Coefficient
Conscription
Military
Expenditure
% of Population
in Military
Previous Military
Regime
Ethnic Diversity
Religious
Diversity
Mortality Rate
Growth in GDP
Per Capita
Exports as % of
GDP
Regime Type
Population
Growth
% of Population
Employed
Growth in GDP
Deflator
Muslim Majority

Case A
Std.Err

Marginal
Effect
44.0
-4.6

Coefficient

Case B
Std.Err

2.114425***
0.4101551***

0
0.047864

Marginal
Effect
211.3
40.8

0.440322
-0.04603

0
0.047864

0.062613

0.087819

6.3

-0.3915953***

0.087819

-38.9

0.9890871**

0

98.8

0.5214469**

0

52.1

-1.44545
0.037775

0.00599
0.005406

-0.9
0.0

1.066686
-1.019652*

0.00599
0.005406

0.6
-0.5

0.3140741***
-0.1053711***

0.148609
0.136794

31.4
-10.5

0.1039143**
0.04047

0.148609
0.136794

10.3
4.0

-0.0207115*

0.491727

-2.1

-0.0335139***

0.491727

-3.3

-0.1212929**
-0.1900219*

0.145128
0.033472

-12.1
-19.0

0.013117
-0.2184848**

0.145128
0.033472

1.3
-21.7

-0.02052

0.265672

-2.1

-0.1101708***

0.265672

-10.9

0.0016247***

17.42619

0.2

0.0010091**

17.42619

0.1

-2.626168***

0

-2.827351***

0

-282.6

Oil Exporter
Landlocked
North America

1.4753**
-0.05861
-1.16393

0
0
0

1.702754***
1.255074***
2.321121**

0
0
0

170.2
125.4
232.1

South America
Africa
Middle East
Asia

-0.35352
-0.34531
2.018937
0.638854

0
0
0
0

262.5
147.5
-5.9
116.3
-35.3
-34.5
201.8
63.9

-0.9088
3.487229***
2.723055***
5.003766***

0
0
0
0

-90.8
347.8
272.1
500.1

*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

The next section of Table 4 lists the sensitivity analysis for case B. The results show that
most of the variables from the restricted model are still significant and maintain their direction,
with the exception of ethnicity which loses significance and religion with gains significance. The
inclusion of other variables now increases the magnitudes of the military characteristics so now a
one percent change in military size decreases the probability by 39%.
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Countries that have conscription experienced a 211% increase in the probability of
instability while a one standard deviation change in religious diversity reduces the probability by
0.5% once again suggesting that more religiously diverse militaries are less likely to cause state
failure. The estimates for the health and economic variables maintain their direction and
significance with exports and employment reducing the probability by 3% and 10% respectively,
once again suggesting that favourable economic conditions help prevent state failure and internal
violence. We also find that countries with a Muslim majority decrease the probability of state
failure and internal violence by 282% while oil exporting countries increase the probability by
170%. This can be attributed to the fact that Muslim societies tend to be somewhat socially
restricted than their non Muslim counterparts. Oftentimes the regime in these countries enacts
laws or adopts stances that affect the ways in which individuals interact. This leads to big
differences between Muslim countries and non Muslim countries on what are socially accepted
behaviours. Also for countries with dependency on oil exports the distribution of the gains is not
always equal. Sometime some groups are marginalised when the oil is extracted from their
region, leading to resentment, protests and violent behaviour towards the government or the
extraction companies. The results from the analysis also show that all the regions, except South
America significant in increasing the probability of instability. With an increase of 232% for
North America, 347% for Africa, 272% for the Middle East and 500% for Asia. The Large effect
of these region variables is most likely due to the inclusion of certain countries within these
regions. Further examination shows that when these countries (i.e., Mexico for North America or
India for Asia) are excluded the sign, significance, and magnitude of the regions either changes,
or becomes insignificant. This leads to the conclusion that the region variable is a poor indicator
of country diversity within a region.
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Table 5 includes the robustness check for case C and D. The results show that the
direction and overall significance of the original variables remains unchanged with the exception
of a decrease in the marginal effect of conscription. However ethnic diversity is now significant
with a one standard deviation change leading to a 0.9% increase in the probability of state failure
and ethnic war. This suggests that militaries that are more ethnically diverse are not exempt from
conflict along ethnic lines. Once again the results also show that favourable economic policies
lead to a decrease in the probability by 2.9% and 3% respectively. Again we see that countries
with a major Muslim population are less likely to have state failure and internal war, decreasing
the probability by 139.7% while Oil exporters decrease the probability of state failure and
internal war by 141%. An explanation for this could be that countries with if a civil war or ethnic
war to occur, a drop in production could occur seeing as the opposition will try to cut off the
flow of income into the country by destroying or disrupting production. Secondly the regime also
risks losing control of a valuable asset as both sides try to control the main source of income.
This makes the cost of a state failure and internal war high for these countries. The result also
suggests that landlocked countries decrease the probability of a state failure. Once again we see
that the region variables are significant with the South America Region decreasing the
probability of state failure and as was stated earlier this is due to country variations not properly
captured by the region variable.
The next section of the table lists the results for case D. The result shows that when
health, economic, political, country characteristics, and regional variables are accounted for,
military size and previous military regime are the only military variables that still maintain their
significance. The results also show that the mortality rate and inflation increase the probability of
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state failure and coups by 15% and 1% while countries that are more democratic reduce the
probability by 21.7%.
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for Case C and Case D
Coefficient
Conscription
Military
Expenditure
% of Population in
Military
Previous Military
Regime
Ethnic Diversity
Religious Diversity
Mortality Rate
Growth in GDP Per
Capita
Exports as % of
GDP
Regime Type
Population Growth
% of Population
Employed
Growth in GDP
Deflator
Muslim Majority
Oil Exporter
Landlocked
North America
South America
Africa
Middle East
Asia

-0.4383802**
0.3018914***

Case C
Std.Err

Marginal
Effect
0
-43.8
0.047864 28.7

Coefficient
-0.15793
-0.2689

Case D
Std.Err

Marginal
Effect
0
-15.8
0.047864
-26.8

-0.01322

0.087819

-1.3

0.1066143**

0.087819

10.6

0.4537336**

0

45.3

1.693007**

0

169.1

1.553267***
-2.615848***
0.032175
0.017235

0.00599
0.005406
0.148609
0.136794

0.9
-1.3
3.1
1.6

-1.06066
-1.43499
0.1522816*
-0.0853

0.00599
0.005406
0.148609
0.136794

-0.6
-0.8
15.2
-8.5

-0.0307266***

0.491727

-2.9

-0.01179

0.491727

-1.2

-0.02142
-0.15826
-0.0313031**

0.145128
0.033472
0.265672

-2.0
-15.0
-3.0

-0.2177475**
-0.0648
-0.01381

0.145128
0.033472
0.265672

-21.7
-6.5
-1.4

0.000956

17.42619

0.1

0.0007372**

17.42619

0.1

-1.398009***
-1.411125***
-1.658364***
0.646925
-1.424837**
0.527368
0.8039399**
1.440359***

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-139.7
-141.0
-165.7
64.7
-142.4
52.6
80.3
144.0

-1.02162
-0.42701
0.040266
0.198766
-1.48801
0.949773
0.430281

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-102.1
-42.7
4.0
19.9
-148.4
94.9
43.0

*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.

Performing the sensitivity analysis has shown that with the exception of Case A all of the
other military variables maintained their significance and in most cases their direction. The
predictive capabilities of the model can be further examined by looking at the classification
tables in appendix A & B. in it one can see that using a probability of 0.5 the model correctly
predicts at least 90% of the cases across the definition of instability.
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So if all the countries are predicted to not have state failure then we would be correct at
least 90% of the time. Given the specification and predictive power of the model we can create a
ranking system for the countries in the dataset that are most likely to have state failure. From the
table in appendix C the results show that Angola tops the list with a 30% probability of state
failure. for the second case we find that Armenia has a 47% chance of state failure and internal
violence, while for the third case we find that Mauritania has an almost 77% chance of state
failure and internal wars, while Myanmar has a 20% chance of state failure and a coup.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

This analysis, examined the relationship between the military and political instability for
115 countries across 17 years. This analysis was unique in how it approached the definition of
political instability, how it viewed the military and through the use of maximum likelihood
estimation techniques the relationship between some characteristics of the military and political
instability were measured. The results showed that all the military variables except percent of the
population in the military were significant in the first case. However this did not hold when the
model was expanded to include other variables with previous military rule remaining as the only
significant variable. In the second case, conscription, military expenditure percent of population
in the military previous military rule and religious diversity were significant in explaining the
onset of state failure and internal war. It also suggested military size was inversely related to
instability. Once again in the third case conscription, military expenditure, past military regimes,
ethnic diversity and religious diversity were significant with conscription and religious diversity
decreasing the likelihood of instability. In the final case the only significant variables were past
military regimes and military size, with both of these events being shown to have a positive
relationship. The findings of this study suggested the only military characteristic that was
significant throughout was past military regime in the country. This suggests that the effects of
military regimes linger long after the regime has been replaced.

28

There are several short comings to be noted in this analysis, one of which lies in ho
political instability was defined as the onset of very few extreme events. Not only does the focus
of a few extreme events ignore the wide scope of instability it also limits the number of cases in
which instability can be measured. Furthermore the study only focused on the occurrence and
excluded impact. Performing the analysis in this manner excludes the full scope of the effects of
military characteristics on political instability. Another issue lies in the type of variables used to
proxy for various military characteristics. For example military expenditure might give us
insights as to the relationship between current regimes and the military but there may be good
reason for us to suspect these figures, simply because defense expenditure is a very sensitive
issue. Some countries might choose not to report their military budget or provide misleading
information in order to maintain secrecy which could lead to biased estimates in any analysis.
However the framework presented here may serve as a starting point for other research in this
field. For example this analysis did not examine the effects of the military on political stability
when a regime is an autocracy versus when it is a democracy. Furthermore due to the short time
period and nature of the data, the analysis was unable to examine if the relationship holds if we
shift the focus to foreign militaries.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
Table 6: Classification Table of Estimated Model for Case A with a cut off value of 0.5
Classified

TRUE

FALSE

Total

+
-

10
39

2
1673

12
1712

1675
Pr( + D)
Pr( -~D)
Pr( D +)
Pr(~D -)

1724
20.41%
99.88%
83.33%
97.72%

+

Pr( +~D)
Pr( - D)
Pr(~D +)

0.12%
79.59%
16.67%

-

Pr( D -)

2.28%

Total
49
Sensitivity
Specificity
Positive predictive value
Negative predictive value
False + rate for true ~D
False - rate for true D
False + rate for
classified
False - rate for
classified
Correctly classified

97.62%

Classified as + if predicted probability >=.5

Table 7: Classification Table of Estimated Model for Case B with a cut off value of 0.5
Classified

TRUE

FALSE

Total

+
-

20
94

12
1598

32
1692

1610
Pr( + D)
Pr( -~D)
Pr( D +)
Pr(~D -)

1724
17.54%
99.25%
62.50%
94.44%

+

Pr( +~D)
Pr( - D)
Pr(~D +)

0.75%
82.46%
37.50%

-

Pr( D -)

5.56%

Total
114
Sensitivity
Specificity
Positive predictive value
Negative predictive value
False + rate for true ~D
False - rate for true D
False + rate for
classified
False - rate for
classified
Correctly classified

Classified as + if predicted probability >=.5
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93.85%

APPENDIX B
Table 8: Classification Table of Estimated model for Case C with a cut off value of 0.5
Classified

TRUE

+
-

FALSE

Total

14
1512

61
1663

1526
Pr( + D)
Pr( -~D)
Pr( D +)
Pr(~D -)

1724
23.74%
99.08%
77.05%
90.92%

+

Pr( +~D)
Pr( - D)
Pr(~D +)

0.92%
76.26%
22.95%

-

Pr( D -)

9.08%
90.43%

47
151

Total
198
Sensitivity
Specificity
Positive predictive value
Negative predictive value
False + rate for true ~D
False - rate for true D
False + rate for
classified
False - rate for classified
Correctly classified

Classified as + if predicted probability >=.5

Table 9: Classification Table of Estimated model for Case D with a cut off value of 0.5
Classified

TRUE

+
-

FALSE

Total

1
1260

2
1283

1261
Pr( + D)
Pr( -~D)
Pr( D +)
Pr(~D -)

1285
4.17%
99.92%
50.00%
98.21%

+

Pr( +~D)
Pr( - D)
Pr(~D +)

0.08%
95.83%
50.00%

-

Pr( D -)

1.79%
98.13%

1
23

Total
24
Sensitivity
Specificity
Positive predictive value
Negative predictive value
False + rate for true ~D
False - rate for true D
False + rate for
classified
False - rate for classified
Correctly classified

Classified as + if predicted probability >=.5
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APPENDIX C
Table 10: Country Rankings based on model specification
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Country
Angola
Congo Kinshasa
Rwanda
Guinea-Bissau
Sierra Leone
Central African
Niger
Cote d'Ivoire
Azerbaijan
CongoBrazzaville
Myanmar
Burundi
Cameroon
Liberia
Zimbabwe

Case A
0.3061511
0.2869706
0.2031458
0.1900324
0.1802820
0.1342669
0.1339337
0.1316810
0.1195234
0.1180815

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.1096003
0.0999467
0.0970355
0.0881145
0.0861781

11
12
13
14
15

Table 11: Country Rankings based on model specification
Rank Country
Case C
Rank
0.778843
1
1 Mauritania
0.713463
2
2 Myanmar
0.542464
3
3 India
0.476109
4
4 Sri Lanka
0.42817
5
5 Jordan
0.388896
6
6 Pakistan
0.353041
7
7 Turkey
0.334991
8
8 Nicaragua
0.286686
9
9 Morocco
0.282814
10
10 Cambodia
0.27959
11
11 El Salvador
0.275995
12
12 Liberia
0.262375
13
13 Oman
0.259978
14
14 Saudi Arabia
0.250721
15
15 Guinea-Bissau
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Top 15 for All Cases

Country
Armenia
Angola
Algeria
Mauritania
Mali
Pakistan
Congo Kinshasa
South Africa
Laos
Thailand
India
Sudan
Myanmar
Vietnam
Central African

Country
Myanmar
Sierra Leone
Rwanda
Zimbabwe
Tajikistan
Niger
Mauritania
Egypt
Gambia, The
Uganda
Guinea-Bissau
Laos
Azerbaijan
Vietnam
Congo-Brazzaville

Case B
0.4734353
0.4508262
0.4254321
0.3775893
0.3738092
0.3697733
0.3269491
0.2736813
0.2734862
0.2600241
0.2434248
0.2338147
0.2123209
0.1923772
0.1889096

Case D
0.192681
0.171692
0.128263
0.110859
0.099788
0.095973
0.093888
0.082249
0.062117
0.051525
0.04633
0.044618
0.043668
0.041665
0.041203
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